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[I want to start by exempting myself from this invitation for merciless criticism at the end, in my new responsible position, to use a word that is commonly applied to the Government of South Vietnam (which is my main responsibility) I am feeling rather fragile as a result of the last couple of months. Merciless criticism on any subject I don't need. Friendly, supporting comments.] The Cuban Missile crises ¹⁹⁶² ~~in 1962~~ ^{was} ~~were~~ just recently commemorat^{ed} ~~ing~~ left us with ambivalent attitudes toward both the notion of crises and the notion of management. It taught us that crises could be good if they could result in the advancement of national aims, if they were not entirely episodes of anxiety and offensive behavior. It raised the possibility that crises could be looked at to some extent as opportunities. At the same time the word management (as in news management) acquired some unfavorable connotations and yet the crises coincided with a growing feeling that the likelihood of ^a major war ^{not} ~~un~~preceded by a crisis ^{was} ~~growing~~ ^{growing} much smaller than we considered earlier. Those of you who have been ^{dealing with} ~~in~~ command and control problems for years know that most of the effort over the years [really [I would say] was based upon planning for ~~and planning related to~~ an episode that was ~~thought of as~~ essentially ^{an} ~~and~~ out of the blue kind of aggression against the United States. The indications of the Cuban crises and [then looking back on] other incidents that we've been through began to impress people more with the thought that if major war ever ^{comes} ~~came~~, in particular if major nuclear war ^{comes} ~~ever came~~, it ^{will} ~~would~~ come as a result of a major crises preceded by a crises. [which is to say that] it would not be in the nature of a building that burned to the ground before the fire alarm alerted

the Fire Department, ^{It} ~~but that~~ would be preceded by a period of urgent searching for a solution at the highest levels of the Government, ~~period of internal consultations, a period of~~ ^{prolonged} ~~very deep and somewhat~~ prolonged that is having some duration, a period of soul searching at the highest levels of Government, ^{of} consultations with our allies and, probably, ^{of} communications of various forms with opponents. ⁴ Why this perception didn't ~~(really focus interest didn't)~~ arise much earlier is a ~~(little)~~ hard to say because there ^{had} ~~have~~ been events that the newspapers label crises ~~and much the same terms as the Cuban crises before~~ without apparently having raised this kind of attention. We can all think of Suez, Lebanon, ^{and} ~~the~~ Kuwait, on a slightly lesser scale, such events ~~that~~ ^{were} typically labeled crises as the break-up of the 1960 Paris summit conference, the U-2 episode, ^{events} ~~even things~~ like the skybolt and episode, certainly the bay of pigs. ~~(We can all think of these~~ ^{amount} ~~affairs)~~ In part, ~~the~~ probably they didn't raise the same ~~deal~~ of attention and interest because in the case, ^{or the} for example, of Kuwait (and some of the others) ^{about} ~~the~~ bay of pigs, there was considerable public disagreement ^{should} ~~with~~ the objectives that ~~seemed~~ ^{There was a} to be pursued. ~~★~~ good deal of controversy (unlike ~~typically~~ the Cuban crises) so that the administration at the time didn't get ~~the~~ credit for the degree of management which it may have exhibited during the crises. ~~and~~ This lack of publicity inhibited the notion that ~~didn't really raise these crises as such as something to be studied and~~ ^{ed} ~~learn from~~ ^{that} ~~and management is something to be analysed and improved.~~ Well, ^{One} ~~as I say~~ this is ~~the~~ legacy of the Cuban crises to a large extent. ⁴ ~~2~~ In connection with my duties in ISA, I'm involved in day-to-day operations concerning South Vietnam ^{these} ~~which~~ ^{have the} obviously ~~character~~

My present job was of rather continuing crises, ~~but that's only been for a couple of~~ months. It ~~happens to be~~ preceded by some six months ^{during} which I was studying crises, past crises with hope to learning some insides ^{ights} that would be available in the future. ~~I got as a newspaper reader~~ As a person whose knowledge of crises had earlier been based mainly on the newspapers, I got in the course of that study a good many ^{had been} surprises as to what ~~was~~ going on. It left me with the feeling that crises were not only an unstudied, but really an understood phenomenon which means of course that study can be expected to be rewarding. At the same time, ~~something that~~ ^{this} ~~of~~ I became most conscious of in the course of ~~the~~ study ~~were~~ the obstacles to research on crises. In many cases, unanticipated obstacles, ~~one~~ barriers that developed, ~~arose~~ ^{the} pressures that arose against studying these phenomenon, the walls that are constructed around the inner phenomenon ^{of} of crises ^{mainly} had been hidden from me, ^{largely} ~~largely~~ and I think ^{they} are hidden from a good many people. And they are significant in themselves. In fact, ~~to~~ ^{have} think I'm going to organize this brief talk around some of the aspects of crises ^{crises} ~~(which are barriers of)~~ which constitute barriers ^{and} ~~as~~ and problems to ~~the~~ study ~~of them~~. I think that to understand some of these problems, some of the peculiar aspects of crises data, is to understand some important things about crises. The aspects of crises then that I'm going to talk about are four: the crises as failure, the crises as surprise, the crises as dialogue, and the crises as summit. ~~Now I'm going to enlarge on these in sort of a couple of~~ ^{rounds}. The fact is that the major crises that ~~the have come to mind~~ ^{others that} ~~the ones that~~ I've listed, and ^{can think of} ~~the ones that~~ you think do have the characteristics of coming, as they appear in the newspapers, ~~at least~~ ^{on} ~~as~~ surprises, and as a matter of fact, ~~in~~ ^{on} a close examination,

they usually did involve significant ^{1969.}surprises. Now these ^Ssurprises
 were not always what the public thought they were, or what the President^T
 may have said they were, ^{or} what various columnists may have said they
 were. But they ^{re} seemed to be and ^{re} (nevertheless) they were very significant
 aspects of surprises. ⁹This in itself becomes surprising as you begin
 to delve into the process of crises decision making. ~~Because of course~~
 one thing you become aware of is the extraordinary range of information
 that the President has available to him, ^{and variety} The kinds of information,
 who ^{se} secrecy is quite ~~as~~ well guarded, ~~the variety of these things,~~ and
 the intensity of the intelligence ~~estimate~~ ^{ing} of process lead up to
 these ~~advances~~ ^{events} and the fact that despite this effort and the sophistication
 of it, ~~and I know a number of you must be involved in supporting that~~
~~effort in one way or another, in spite of these, quite,~~ shocking sur-
 prises did occur. (And the fact that the crises began with, now we one)
 of course the dramatic ^{surprise} ~~one I mentioned~~ of Cuba was the actual appearance
 of the MREB's and IRBM's on Cuba, but in several of the other cases I
 mentioned, ^{there} ~~as well~~ were major surprises. Suez, ~~this~~ is one that is a
 little complicated to discuss because ~~the~~ ^{the} surprise was not certainly
 the simple fact that the British and French did cooperate with the
 Israel^{as} in the attack, but the timing of the attack, the exact nature
 of the attack, did in fact involve tactically, at least, quite startling
^Ssuprise to Eisenhower and Dallas. This is ^t attested by a number of
 people in public accounts, ~~of this now, supported internally~~ ⁹ or
⁴ ~~course~~ all that's necessary is that there ^{be} surprise about a significant

detail, and by that I mean something that would have made a difference
 if you predicted it. It doesn't have to be gross outlines of the event,
 but it ~~can~~ can be the timing, it can be the precise direction, it can
 be the statements that accompany it, or the other events that accompany
 it, things which if they had been anticipated would have made a difference
 to the decision maker. To use the technical term ~~for~~ ^{from} decision theory,
 these are events whose occurrence is associated ^{with} regret, great
 regret by the decision maker. ~~And as I say~~ ^{phenomena} this seems to be associated
 strongly with these major crises, although ^{you} ~~it~~ would not necessarily put
 it as part of the definition. ~~Now~~ ⁱⁿ I want to come back ~~for~~ a moment to
 some of the consequences of the fact of surprise, ~~but I was just mentioning~~
~~this aspect.~~ ^{Next} These crises as failure, ^{an} the very fact of ~~x~~ urgent challenge
 requiring very urgent high-level consideration, Presidential participa-
 tion almost presupposes that somewhere the system has failed. Retro-
 spectively, everyone may be absolved from this implication but in
 the meantime the very existence of the situation raises ~~open right~~
~~to question.~~ ¹¹ Raises the presupposition that, as in the poem, ~~that has~~
~~popped into my head~~ someone had blundered ~~somewhere~~, someone had failed
 to foresee. There is a presumption to this effect which may or may
 not turn out to be true. Someone had failed to foresee the situation
 and planned for it earlier which is why you ~~seemed to~~ find yourself
 having to work late all night, in fact all weekend, ~~which is kind of~~
 a ~~definition of a crisis~~, and why the President has to be flown to and
 from Texas, ~~or come back from Texas or that sort of thing, why it hasn't~~
~~taken care of earlier~~ in other words. Somebody ~~had~~ failed. Or, the
 thing had been foreseen, ~~had~~ ^{it had} somehow not been prepared for ^{or} the
 implications hadn't been foreseen. Steps were not taken to detour
 the ^{or} ~~opposing~~ moves that had raised the crises or to counter them in

advance. The crisis is almost defined by the need to consider violent counter measures in the short run. Why were not alternatives prepared or used that would have proclued^d the ⁿeed for these violent ^{ent} alternatives. ⁷ Now ~~Now~~ these are all questions which ~~to be defined~~ ~~relevance~~

~~operationally here~~ which are going to be asked the President in his press conference. And the ~~prospect~~ ^e of these questions may keep the

President from having a press conference in the next week or two.

~~in this event~~ ⁹ This ^{is a crisis} is a rather good test. He is going to have to

face those questions in the press, in the cables from our allies,

and in his official family. To say that those ^e questions were raised

is to say that the president had ^s political stakes ~~in the administration~~ ~~has political stakes~~ in this episode which we label a crises.

It means ~~that then~~ that he can ~~be~~, however it comes out, ~~he can~~ be

^{as} judged ~~has~~ having failed in some respect and of course he has many potential failures still ahead of him. By definition, ~~unavoidable~~ ^{role}

~~the~~ public attention has focused upon the President's ~~role~~ and the administration policy in this episode, which means his decisions

will have to be made in the light of the outcome but also in the light of whatever leaks out of the decision process. He will be

judged on the bases ⁱ ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ of his competence in general and

this has ^{particular} political significance ^{if the crisis arises} ~~in particular when this thing comes~~

near ~~a political payoff that is an election; a period of payoff.~~

When the public ~~is in mind to~~ ^{will weigh} ~~wieght~~ what it hears and what it

learns about Presidential performance in ^{ve} administration performance,

and act on it by their votes. ~~Now~~ ^{ve} curiously, I think, ~~having looked~~